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Abstract  
 
The ongoing discussions on the fluid boundaries between ‘propaganda’ and ‘persuasion’ have 
emerged in numerous studies, the most prominent being Jowett and O’Donnell (2006). Sharing their 
views, Herman and Chomsky (1988) argued on the repercussions of only using elite sources in media 
reports due to their capacity to mobilise the masses for a single cause and shape elite opinions, due to 
the absence of alternative or opposing viewpoints. This case study examined the nature of propaganda 
strategies adopted by the colonial British during the Malayan Emergency that proved to be highly 
effective. This study consisted of two separate elements. First, it extends the discussion on 
propaganda by examining the significance of ‘race’ used as a crucial element within the discourses of 
anti-communism, as a legitimate rationale to mobilise forces, primarily within a Malayan context. 
Second, it investigated how propaganda strategies such as the forced resettlement of the ethnic 
Chinese, strategies used in framing the insurgents, and psychological warfare operated as powerful 
mechanisms to shape propaganda communication. A comparative content analysis of two mainstream 
English newspapers – namely The Times (London) and Straits Times (Singapore) – was conducted to 
identify trends in reporting used. Juxtaposing this method was the administration of in-depth 
interviews with ex-service personnel who had actively served in Malaya during the Malayan 
Emergency.  The findings of this research reveal a significant correlation between ‘race’ and the 
constructs of communism.  The results also indicate that psychological strategies adopted by the 
British in the form of deeds and news production proved to be highly effective.  
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The Propaganda Strategies Adopted by the Colonial British During the Malayan 
Emergency, 1948–1960 as Applied in Newspaper Coverage: A Case Study 
Prabavathy Bangaroo and Niranjala (Nina) Weerakkody 
 
Introduction 
This paper reports on a study that comparatively content analysed the coverage of the 
Malayan Emergency (1948–1960) by The Times (London) and the Straits Times (Singapore) 
to examine how discourses about the insurgents were framed and correlated with the 
propaganda strategies adopted by the Colonial British and may have served to set elite public 
opinion in Britain and Malaya at the time. It was supplemented with the findings of in-depth 
interviews conducted with ex-service personnel who had served in Malaya during the 
Emergency, that support some of the findings of the newspaper content analysis.  
While there has been abundant literature on the use of propaganda in times of unrest 
and conflict, especially within US and British contexts, ranging from both World Wars to 
Iraq and Afghanistan (Lasswell, 1977, 1971; Herman and Chomsky, 1988; Wilcox, 2005; 
Cottle, 2006; Jowett and O’Donnell, 2006), there is a lack of empirical findings or research 
on propaganda dissemination in a domestic conflict, especially so within a colonial setting 
perpetrated by colonial powers. Past research on British colonial propaganda during the 
Malayan Emergency had been largely qualitative focusing primarily on historical narratives 
(Deery, 2007, 2003; Clutterbuck, 1966; Hack, 2009, 1999; Ramakrishna, 2002). This paper 
attempts to fill a methodological gap in providing empirical findings through the adoption of 
a three-step triangulation method consisting of three separate modes of data collection – in-
depth interviews, newspaper content analysis and archival research on propaganda 
dissemination in a domestic conflict, especially within a colonial setting. This study provides 
findings that can lead to further studies on media agenda setting and their effects on 
audiences. 
 
Background 
 
The Malayan Emergency spanned over 12 years – June 1948 to July 1960 – and was 
often referred to as the ‘Long, Long War’ (Clutterbuck, 1966). The root of this conflict 
stemmed from hostilities caused by a group that emanated from a sizeable local army 
approximating 6,000–10,000 (Clutterbuck, 1966; Jackson, 1991; Coates, 1992). This 
Malayan Peoples’ Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) was established by the British colonial 
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administration to help fight the Japanese during World War II. With the end of the War, a 
majority of the MPAJA members joined the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) to fight the 
British in order to end their colonial rule (Jackson, 1991). As priorities shifted, the MCP, by 
then operating under the banner of the Malayan Races’ Liberation Army (MRLA), vied to 
fight for a Communist ‘People’s Government’, while the British struggled to regain its 
authority over the colony once the Japanese occupation of Malaya had ended. The MCP 
members were largely ethnic Chinese Malayans – a fundamental detail the British, especially 
the Colonial Office in Great Britain, were keenly aware of, widely publicised and exploited. 
The Malayan Emergency began with many minor incidents – mainly attacks on the locals. 
However, the British authorities started to respond to them only after the murder of three 
European managers by the MCP, in a rubber plantation on 16 June 1948.  This brought about 
the declaration of a Federation-wide State of Emergency in Malaya, by the British on 18 June 
1948 (Ramakrishna, 2002). 
According to Kumar Ramakrishna (2002) and Karl Hack (2009), the Malayan 
Emergency can be classified into four chronological chapters, viz.: 
1. June 1948 – May 1950 – The period of turmoil and increased violence from MCP 
members to overthrow British control. 
2. May 1950 – February 1952 – A period where MCP members tried to seize power in 
Malaya due to the weaknesses of the British civil and military sectors, especially after 
WWII. 
3. February 1952 – May 1954 – This third stage marked a turning point for the British 
with strengthened military and civil resources. Propaganda communication, through 
words and deeds, proved to be beneficial to the British during this period. 
4. June 1954 – December 1958 – This final stage saw a decline in terrorist activities and 
strength, resulting in an end to the crisis that finally saw Malaya gaining its 
independence in August 1957. 
News Management and Propaganda 
The British Information Research Department of the Foreign Office (IRD) worked 
closely with the British Secret Service, supporting British propaganda communication and 
techniques with the intention to ‘influence public opinion in its favour both at home and 
overseas’ (Fletcher, 1982: 106). A remote station, the Regional Information Office (RIO), as 
another arm of the IRD, was set up in Singapore to produce counter-communist propaganda 
communication. 
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A Memorandum issued by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Cabinet 
underlined proposed improvements to information services for the purposes of: (a) general 
propaganda work, (b) direct ‘psychological warfare’ against the ‘bandits’ and (c) to develop 
an anti-communist propaganda campaign for Malaya’i. Using news management as a key 
priority for propaganda purposes was widespread to ‘ensure that, as far as possible, the 
‘terrorists’ received only as much publicity (and of the right sort) as the government saw fit’ 
(Carruthers, 1995: 90). In addition to defeating communism, there was an urgent need for the 
British to manage their news so as to project a positive image of Great Britain’s economic 
and colonial status to its overseas allies and enemies. 
The local newspapers dominating at the time were the Straits Times, which was 
owned by the company Straits Times Press Ltd, wholly owned by its British board of 
directors and based in Singapore, which was part of Malaya before the former’s 
independence in 1965. The Straits Times was read mostly by the local English-speaking elites 
and British nationals based in Malaya and Singapore, while the New Path News (Sin Lu Pao), 
a British-sponsored Chinese language newspaper, targeted the local rural Chinese population. 
Another local paper, the Kin Kwok Daily News, an anti-communist newspaper, was another 
source employed by the British in opposition to communist propaganda. 
Other media forms managed by the Psychological Warfare Division were propaganda 
leaflets distributed/dropped by the Royal Air Force that ranged between 53 million in 1950 
and 77 million in 1953 (Jackson, 1991). Radio Malaya was used for local radio broadcasts, 
and voice aircrafts referred to as the ‘Stop Press of the Jungle’ (Simpson, 1999) were used to 
broadcast anti-communist messages and to drop propaganda leaflets. Mobile cinema shows 
and plays were prominent as effective media forms. Ex-MCP members who were also known 
as Surrendered Enemy Personnel (SEP) were used by the British to put up local plays and 
speeches to encourage other MCP members to surrender. 
 
The Briggs Plan, Race and Resettlement 
 
The element of ‘race’ became a vital tool during this conflict, especially when 
mobilising other races – predominantly the Malays and Indians – to support the British. The 
primary aim of British propaganda was to destroy insurgent morale and create division 
between the Chinese and other races in Malaya promoting a ‘divide and rule’ strategy within 
Malaya’s plural society of Chinese, Malays and Indians (Ramakrishna, 2002). This was made 
clear with the introduction of the ‘new villages’ that arose with the resettlement program 
 
 
6 
 
proposed in the Briggs Plan of 1950 – an initiation of Sir Harold Briggs, the Director of 
Emergency Operations at that time. It saw 86% of the Chinese Malayan population forced or 
‘resettled’ into these segregated ‘new villages’. This containment initiative housed a large 
number of Chinese squatters/villagers suspected of aiding MCP members, willingly or under 
duress, allegedly providing the insurgents with food, money, medical supplies, clothing and 
information on British troop positions. These resettlement villages, surrounded by barbed 
wire and entrenchments, were deemed to be highly effective British counter-insurgency 
propaganda of deeds similar to the rewards policy (Clutterbuck, 1966), that resulted in the 
‘severing [of] the umbilical cord’ between the MCP members and local reinforcements 
(Deery, 2007: 53). 
 
Theoretical Framework 
 
This study adopts a functionalist paradigm, with attempts made to explain how and 
why some of these strategies worked and how media effects such as agenda setting and 
framing did not operate consistently in ways they were originally intended to, especially 
within a Malayan context as the conflict ended with Malaya gaining independence from 
Britain. The theoretical frameworks adopted were that of media agenda setting (McCombs, 
2004), gatekeeping (White, 1950; Shoemaker and Vos, 2009) and framing of discourses (van 
Dijk, 1985; Entman, 1989, 2007, 2010) that refer to the selecting, emphasising and distorting 
of information for psychological impact on targeted audiences. 
 
Literature Review 
 
Media Power, Propaganda and Public Opinion 
 
The nature of propaganda and ongoing discussions on the fluid boundaries between 
‘propaganda’ and ‘persuasion’ emerges in the studies of Jowett and O’Donnell (2006). As 
propaganda scholars, Jowett and O’Donnell claim that propaganda is almost always in some 
‘form of activated ideology’ and at times agitating and arousing an audience to act, lending 
credence to the hypodermic needle theory (Sparks, 2013: 58; Schramm, 1971). This will be 
especially valid within contexts and times in history where other more dominant and easily 
accessible modes of information and alternative viewpoints were unavailable to the targeted 
audiences. 
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In defining the levels of propaganda, Jowett and O’Donnell (2006: 16) categorise or 
label them according to source and information accuracy as either ‘white’ (where the source 
is clearly identified with the information likely to be accurate to maintain credibility but not 
necessarily verifiable); ‘black’ (as the other extreme with sources concealed and false 
information communicated to deceive); and finally, ‘grey’ propaganda (where sources may 
sometimes be identified or concealed with the accuracy of information disseminated being 
uncertain). 
Herman and Chomsky’s (1988) study on propaganda developed a similar view and 
adopted the position that highly emotive messages propagated by elite sources have a 
staggering capacity to mobilise the masses for a single cause.  Another concept closely 
related to news media effects and public opinion is McCombs’ (2004) study stemming from 
the initial work of Lippmann’s (1965) titled Public Opinion. In terms of racial stereotyping, 
McCombs refers to the ‘cause-and-effect relationship between media agenda and public 
agenda’ (McCombs, 2004: 16) that draws on the impact of stereotypes on public opinion. His 
study found that the news media, in creating a fixed set of qualities or stereotypes for a 
particular race, no matter how subtle, has the effect of governing the way the public would 
perceive that race. This is especially so when audience members have no direct experiences 
with the relevant issues or particular groups of people involved and are therefore completely 
dependent on media depictions for creating their social reality (Adoni and Mane, 1984; 
Berger and Luckman, 1966). 
 
The Propaganda Model and News Production  
 
The ‘propaganda model’ of news production, as introduced by Herman and Chomsky 
(1988), will help inform some theoretical underpinnings of this study. Although this model 
has met with some scholarly criticisms for its failure to take into account journalistic 
objectivity and professionalism (Hallin, 1994), and disregarding audiences’ oppositional 
readings (Hall, 1980) to dominant frames (LaFeber, 1988; Schlesinger, 1989; Hallin, 1994), 
this study will rely on this model, within limits, particularly to reflect on media’s behaviour 
in conforming to elite agenda setting dominating during the Malayan Emergency. The 
prevailing argument contradicting the ‘propaganda model’ (Herman and Chomsky, 1988) 
predictions centres on the fact that media have a commitment to state the ‘truth’ and 
objectivity of journalists.  However, it can be argued that in the case of mid-twentieth-century 
Great Britain, especially with respect to events that occurred in Malaya, media performance 
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inclined more towards elite sentiments and explains the way the newspaper medium operated. 
After all, ‘It was an axiom of British propaganda always to tell the truth – but the truth was 
presented to give the British point of view’ (Fletcher, 1982: 102). This situation is analogous 
to the Fox News coverage in the 2000s strongly supporting the George W Bush government 
and its conservative agenda in the US and worldwide. The New York Times and Washington 
Post and other prestige press followed the US government line after the September 11, 2001 
attacks on New York and the early stages of the war on Iraq. However, this changed when 
these two newspapers later exposed and discussed the secret surveillance of US citizens in 
2005 and the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal in 2004, respectively.    
In terms of news production, five key factors or filters set the foundation to the 
propaganda model, as they merge to sieve out undesirable news and leave the residue as 
pertinent information which is as defined by the elites. These five filters are: ownership, 
funding through advertisements, sourcing, flak and anti-communist fear and ideology 
(Herman and Chomsky, 1988). Profoundly salient and significant to this study will be the 
filter of ‘reliance of the media on information provided by government, business, and 
experts’ known as ‘elite sources and/or opinion’ (Cohen, 1963; Gandy, 1982) and the filter 
constraint of ‘anti-communism’ as a national religion and control mechanism or ideology 
(Herman and Chomsky, 1988: 2). Both these filter constraints appear to be valuable in 
researching the communication of propaganda by the British during the Malayan Emergency.  
This study attempts to augment the fifth filter of the ‘propaganda model’ (Herman and 
Chomsky, 1988) of ‘anti-communism’ to encompass ‘race’ as a component that rendered 
British propaganda effective. By adopting this trajectory and their continued focus on the 
actual racial differences existing within the Malayan population, the mainstream print media 
at the time had provided a pertinent mechanism for future researchers to examine the 
dominant British ideology of anti-communism that prevailed at the time and reproduced by 
the media that helped mobilise local support against their ‘common enemies’ during this 
conflict. This style of reporting and strategy suggests the use of dichotomies of ‘us’ versus 
‘them’ with an explicit intention to mobilise forces against an enemy or ‘them’, which is a 
recurring strategy that has found its way from the twentieth-century through to the present 
with the global ‘war on terror’ narrative. 
 
Discourses and Framing 
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Framing in news discourses examined in the past reveals how the salience of a 
particular story is promoted, minimised or excluded to influence audience perceptions of the 
issues covered by the media (Entman, 1989, 2007, 2010).  Framing of a news discourse is 
shaped by the angle used in reporting a story and choosing a ‘lead’ for it which controls how 
the rest of the story is told and what headlines may be used (Dicken-Garcia, 1998). The use 
of specific adjectives, metaphors, analogies euphemisms and disphemisms when reporting a 
story within a selected frame leads to specific connotations (Planalp, 1998: 69).  Entman 
(1989; 2007; 2010) equally categorises both agenda-setting and framing theoretical 
frameworks under the conceptual umbrella of bias. Kuypers’ (2010) ‘rhetorical framing 
analysis’ framework is helpful when analysing the content in the press during this conflict, 
where news stories were framed using specific features of prominent storylines, 
terminologies and stereotypes to influence its readers’ thinking and interpretations. Van Dijk 
(2008; 1988) and Steuter and Wills (2008) equally assist in interrogating discourses of power, 
ideology and racism, which was evident in the style of communication strategies and political 
rhetoric often used by the dominant British colonial powers.  
Steuter and Wills (2008) found that enlisting discourses to study the framing of news 
with the media’s engagement of metaphors as political rhetoric would help reveal the way 
propaganda constructs reality; ‘othering’ the enemy, and upholding dominant views. 
Emerging from the ‘othering’ and stereotyping perspectives, British colonial rule was 
promoted and justified through racial (Chinese) and ideological (anti-communist) division. 
The British in Malaya, like the French in Cambodia (Edwards, 1996) embraced political 
agendas of constructing an idea and expressing a worldview of themselves as protectors and 
custodians, representing the best interests of the Bumiputeras (Princes of the Land) or the 
Malays against the communist Chinese, hence justifying its colonial presence.  An equally 
prominent framing strategy used was that of ‘code words’ (Graber, 1981), disphemisms (the 
opposite of euphemisms) which make a phenomenon sound worse than it really is to evoke 
strong emotions to shape the thinking of a group of people to behave in a particular manner 
as required by the communicator (Planalp, 1998) 
 
Agenda-setting and Gatekeeping 
 
Empirical studies, conducted in the past (Cohen, 1963; McCombs and Shaw, 1972; 
McLeod, Becker and Byrnes, 1974) revealed agenda-setting as a pervasive and potent media 
effect contributing to information on events or issues being legitimated to alter or shape 
 
 
10 
 
public opinion. The level and depth of facts and news sources the media used in giving 
extensive coverage, while prioritising and defining specific events or issues, defined the 
media as well as elite agenda and contributed to the way public opinion was generally 
formed. In other words, media in defining the saliency of issues make media agenda become 
the agenda of the public (McCombs, 2004).  In finding an indisputable correlation between 
media agenda and public opinion, McCombs (2004) establishes, through his countless studies 
conducted over four decades, a causal relationship between media agenda and public agenda. 
However, this also unequivocally acknowledged other compelling influences that could also 
‘shape individual attitudes and public opinion’. For example, ‘personal experience, general 
culture and exposure to mass media’ (McCombs, 2004: 19) help shed some light on audience 
reactions within the context of Malaya. Likewise, studies by Shoemaker and Vos (2009) 
would assist in further understanding the link between agenda-setting and gatekeeping in the 
ways certain issues that are detrimental to or challenge the dominant status quo are kept out 
and not covered by mass media. They draw attention to political media gatekeeping practices 
as involving the ‘process of culling and crafting countless bits of information’, through the 
selection, manipulation and exclusion of information (Shoemaker and Vos, 2009: 1). A large 
number of empirical research on the agenda-setting function are based on similar assumptions 
of ‘influencing public agenda through media gatekeeping in formulating meaning – selecting, 
screening, interpreting, emphasizing, and distorting information’ (Jowett and O’Donnell, 
2006: 188).   
 
Research Methodology 
 
This case study used both quantitative and qualitative data collection methods; viz., an 
examination of archival documents, content analysis of newspaper coverage and in-depth 
interviews.  
The archival data examined cabinet papers, and some private and confidential 
correspondence in the form of memoranda and letters exchanged between the British 
government and its military officials. These documents were downloaded from the ‘digital 
image system’ of the National Archives, UK, and were used to examine across the period 
analysed the relevant issues raised by the British government during the Malayan Emergency. 
The quantitative and qualitative content analysis examined purposive samples of the 
articles published on the Malayan Emergency by two mainstream English language 
newspapers – namely The Times (London) and Straits Times (Singapore) – based on their 
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geographic location and readership for comparison. The Times was accessed electronically 
from its website while the Straits Times was manually accessed as hardcopy prints from the 
State Library, Victoria, for the period studied. 
The Times (London) was considered a prestigious newspaper that dominated the 
market with a circulation of around 50,000 at that time (Williams, 2009). Despite its small 
circulation figures, The Times was reported to be targeted at mostly the educated elite and 
was considered a ‘politically important and influential’ newspaper that leaned more towards 
‘conservative’ parties in the UK (Negrine, 1994). 
The Straits Times (Singapore) was promoted as ‘Malaya’s National Newspaper’ 
(Turnbull, 1995: 183), with circulation figures exceeding 50,500 in the early fifties. By 1953, 
the Straits Times newspaper’s circulation had skyrocketed over all other competitive local 
newspapers (Turnbull, 1995: 183). 
Using the criteria and guidelines suggested by the political and historical analyst Dr 
Kumar Ramakrishna (2002) and adhering to the chronology of events as stipulated in the 
Journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, the period February 1952 to January 
1953 was identified as the most critical and pivotal stage of the Malayan Emergency and was 
chosen as the time period for the content analysis of the news coverage. The analysis used a 
custom designed coding instrument consisting of 26 items that allowed for the examination of 
several aspects of the coverage. However, this paper reports only the findings obtained using 
14 items of the coding instrument (see Appendix 1) that were relevant to the two aspects 
examined and reported on, viz: 
1. The frequency of the race of insurgents mentioned in the coverage, and; 
2. The terminologies used to describe the insurgents. 
The population or the universe (Weerakkody, 2009: 148) of the news content for the 
study consisted of all Malayan Emergency related coverage in the two newspapers selected 
for analysis during the period under study. This non-probability purposive sample included 
all news stories and commentaries on the Malayan Emergency.  The content analysis coded 
and quantitatively analysed the space allocated to Malayan Emergency stories, and the 
number of times the race of the insurgents were mentioned in the coverages, and qualitatively 
examined the different terminologies used when describing them. These were identified by 
qualitatively examining the statements made or views expressed by the different news 
sources relating to the emergency; violence or riots that erupted due to the conflict; any deeds 
or policies implemented that resulted in the surrender or arrests of insurgents; adjectival 
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descriptors used when describing insurgents and racial profiling; and any other events or 
narratives that appeared in the two newspapers related to the conflict (see Appendix 1). 
In addition, the coding of MCP links to communist countries/organisation/groups and 
space allocation to stories were examined quantitatively (measured in words). Each of these 
variables was categorised, labelled and coded accordingly using the coding instrument and 
coding sheets specifically designed for the study. The construct of the British agenda-setting 
objectives and practices were the dependent variables that are examined in this paper. The 
independent nominal variables examined include: the terminologies adopted by the British to 
describe the insurgents; violence committed by insurgents; links to communist countries; and 
racial profiling of the insurgents by the British. These were used to examine the correlation 
between them and answer the research questions posed in this inductive study. 
 
The Sample of Newspaper Articles 
 
In selecting the relevant articles to be examined from the newspapers published 
during the period under study, purposive sampling was used via selecting a composite week 
for each month with randomly selected days, for example, Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, 
Thursday and Friday chosen in each month for the selected newspapers. All news items 
concerning Malaya and the Malayan Emergency published in the selected papers between 
1 February 1952 and 31 January 1953, excluding issues that were published on the weekend, 
were selected. Through this procedure, 65 news stories from The Times and 207 from the 
Straits Times were identified, totalling 272 news stories which served as the units of analysis 
that were content analysed using the coding manual (the abridged version relevant to this 
paper is provided as Appendix 1). 
 
The Depth Interviews 
 
Depth interviews were conducted with ex-servicemen with the relevant British 
military forces who served during the Malayan Emergency. The 17 interviewees participating 
were all males, consisting of 12 Army and 5 Air Force personnel. These interviews were 
conducted face to face, over the telephone and through email.  
All volunteer participants were selected using purposive sampling based on their 
service in Malaya during the Malayan Emergency. Participants were recruited through 
advertisements in the Vetaffairs newspaper, RSL clubs in Melbourne and The National 
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Malaya and Borneo Veterans Association of Australia (Vic). To allow for a reasonable level 
of diversity and a representative sample, attempts were made to select from the Army, Air 
Force and Navy. Unfortunately, the ex-Navy respondents (2) had to withdraw from this 
study, despite their initial consent to participate, for health/personal reasons. To overcome 
this gap, a book written by former Navy personnel Ian Pfennigwerth entitled Tiger Territory: 
The Untold Story of the Royal Australian Navy in Southeast Asia from 1948–1971 (2008) that 
detailed his naval experiences at that time was used as background information.  
In each semi-structured interview, respondents were presented with three general 
grand tour questions: 
- Duration of service 
- Individual role in respective divisions/battalions 
- Primary role of individual division, battalion, platoon during military activity 
Given that the Malayan Emergency was a conflict fought essentially on land, Army 
ex-service personnel were presented the highest number of 16 semi-structured questions, 
followed by 11 questions for the Air Force personnel. During data analysis, all respondents 
were assigned numbers as identifiers so as to maintain confidentiality in terms of their 
identity throughout this study. 
On focusing primarily on negative propaganda against a race and population control 
that operated as powerful mechanisms to shape and assist in the propaganda communication, 
respondents were asked about racial stereotyping and the adjectives used to describe the 
insurgents; as well as propaganda actions such as forced settlement  (euphemistically called 
‘population control’ at the time) and the reward system – that is, monetary rewards paid to 
insurgents to surrender, which varied between $28,000 for someone with a Chairman’s rank 
to $800 for an ordinary insurgent (Carruthers, 1995).  
 
Findings 
 
Race as a Crucial Element 
 
The findings indicated that giving intensive attention to and promoting the salience of 
a particular race when reporting on insurgents was consistent with attribute of agenda-setting 
and framing used in McCombs (2004). Results from the content analysis showed that the race 
of insurgents specified as ‘Chinese’ figured at 23.1% in The Times newspaper with the Straits 
Times reflecting a higher frequency of mentions, standing at 31%. The Straits Times equally 
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published the names of Chinese insurgents including the offered rewards for their capture. 
Figures mentioning other races were also higher in the Straits Times as opposed to The Times 
(See Table 1). 
 
 
 
 
Table: 1 Race of insurgents mentioned in the newspaper articles analysed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Discussion 
Although a large percentage – The Times (72.3%) and Straits Times (62.8%) – of the 
news stories analysed did not mention race, drawing attention to a particular race and making 
comparisons with other races suggest an agenda-setting effect. As found by McCombs 
(2004), some attributes are ‘more likely than others to be noticed and remembered by the 
audience quite apart from their frequency of appearance’ (2004: 92).  In other words, 
psychologically implanting the information of a large number of communist insurgents 
belonging to a particular race would be more pertinent in the public’s mind and will more 
likely be noticed and remembered by an audience. 
 
 
 
 
Race The Times 
(London) 
Straits Times 
(Singapore) 
TOTAL 
 % % % 
Chinese 23.1 31.0 29.0 
Malay   1.5   4.3   3.7 
Indian   1.5   1.9   1.8 
Other   1.5    0   0.4 
Not 
Applicable 
72.3 62.8 65.1 
Total 23.9 76.1 100 
 n=65 articles n=207 articles N=272 
articles 
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Labelling of Insurgents 
 
Table: 2 Disphemisms and terminologies used in the news stories analysed 
 
Terminologies 
 
The Times 
(London) 
Straits Times 
(Singapore) 
TOTAL 
 % % % 
Communist-
Terrorists 
 30.4   13.4 18.3 
Terrorists  58.7   35.4 42.2 
Bandits    7.7   39.5 30.2 
Gangs    1.8     3.9   3.3 
Insurgents    0     0.6   0.4 
Comrade    0     0.6   0.4 
Reds    0     5.7   4.1 
Other:  
Guerrillas 
Enemy 
 
   1.2 
   0 
 
    0.1 
    0.2 
 
  0.4 
  0.2 
Not 
Applicable 
   0.3     0.6   0.5 
 
Total  29.2   70.8  100 
 n=65 articles n=207 articles N=272 
articles 
 
Discussion 
 
On examining the framing and rhetorical strategies adopted by the British to label the 
insurgents, ‘terrorists’ and ‘communist terrorists’ were the preferred terminologies that were 
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reflected in The Times newspaper, totalled 58.7% and 30.4% respectively for the sample 
analysed. The Straits Times preferred the less threatening term ‘bandits’ – that recorded 
39.5% – used mostly between the period February 1952 to June 1952.  Interestingly, this 
practice changed from June 1952 onward to the preferred term ‘Terrorists’, totalling 35.4%. 
Other labels such as ‘insurgents, gangs, reds and guerrillas’ were also used by the Straits 
Times. A large number of respondents (76%) who were interviewed with regard to this 
question cited ‘bandits’ and ‘terrorists’ as the dominant labels used to refer to insurgents at 
the time, which appeared to be consistent with the results from the content analysis data.  
Planalp (1998) claims the media play a powerful role in shaping emotions.  In the case 
of The Times newspaper, the British had succeeded in mobilising global perceptions to fight 
communism by presenting it as a common global threat (Edwards, 1996) and referring to 
them as ‘terrorists’ at a later stage rather than ‘bandits’, which carries different connotations.  
However, the findings indicated that things differed slightly in Malaya as factors such 
as counter-propaganda by communist parties – especially through acts of threats and violence 
towards the local population – found the locals helping the communist terrorists out of fear. 
This supports findings by van Dijk (2008; 1988) and Entman (2007), who state that framing 
the same news narratives, including the use of lexical terminologies, within different cultures 
and environments would produce contrasting audience reactions. 
Propaganda Strategy of Deeds 
Questions posed to the 17 depth interview respondents who were serving military 
personnel with the British or Australian forces during the insurgency also asked about how 
psychological deeds as supplementary mechanisms, especially population control through 
(forced) resettlement programs and the reward system, assisted in propaganda 
communication. Eighty-eight percent (88%) of respondents revealed that isolation of mostly 
the Chinese race into these ‘new villages’ enabled close and constant surveillance by the 
British and these resettlement programs were considered to be the most productive acts that 
paralleled propaganda messages. Similarly, about 77% of respondents cited the reward 
system as an effective state propaganda measure. One participant in particular summed it up 
by stating that ‘this form of propaganda produced more insurgent surrenders and useful 
information such as insurgent tactics, camp positions and local information on identities of 
communist terrorists’.  
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Conclusion 
 
Evidence, especially in studying the media content in The Times (London) and Straits 
Times (Singapore), shows an integration of gatekeeping, agenda-setting and framing forces 
operating at diverse levels and targeted at different audiences. Responses from interviewees 
were consistent with some of the content analysis findings in that the identification of the 
Chinese race assisted the British to strategise and adopt a propaganda measure of segregation 
or resettlement to allow for increased surveillance and control of large numbers of mainly 
Chinese through strategies of population control. It also justified the segregation and 
surveillance of the Chinese population. Although findings were largely consistent with the 
theoretical paradigms applied, there appears to be a slight disjuncture between media framing 
and public behaviour, especially within the Malayan context – suggesting limited or no 
effects. This could be due to the two newspapers under study being read by mainly English-
educated elites, or the public facing threats from the insurgents, or the servicemen of the 
British and Australian military, rather than the Malayan and British populations in general.  
This study also suggests a strong correlation between race and the constructs of 
communism. This finding contributes to an extension of Herman and Chomsky’s (1988) fifth 
filter constraint in news production of the ideology of ‘anti-communism’ in the ‘propaganda 
model’ to include race as a crucial construct. 
 
Limitations of the Study 
 
It is important to specify the limitations of this study because in extending the 
discussion on propaganda, especially with regards to ‘race’ and ‘othering’ in addition to the 
‘anti-communism’ or ideological filter of the propaganda model (Herman and Chomsky, 
1988), there was no local Malayan population’s perspective (officials, civilians who 
experienced the crisis first hand and local journalists) sought or included in this study. This 
could have been rectified by interviewing a relevant and purposive sample of Malayan 
counterparts. Examining comparable archival materials from the Malayan side and examining 
Malayan newspaper content published in Malay, Chinese or Tamil languages for the same 
period as a comparison will contribute a more holistic perspective to the study’s findings. 
This is a suggestion for further study for the overall topic area and project. Another limitation 
that restricts generalising the findings is the issue of selecting only a limited period of the 
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crisis rather than the entire period of the conflict, which would have allowed for comparison 
within and between the newspapers at various times of the conflict.   
In order to extend the boundaries to discussions on propaganda, further comparative 
analyses of conflicts in colonial settings in Southeast Asia are warranted.  Further research is 
also required to examine audience effects and news bias in media framing, especially through 
content analysis, consistent with political issues and ideologies. 
 
Endnotes 
                                                          
i
 CAB/129/40 Memorandum number C.P. (50) 125, ‘Preliminary Report on visit to Malaya and Singapore, 13 
June 1950. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Project Title: The Propaganda Strategies Adopted by the Colonial British During the Malayan 
Emergency, 1948–1960 as Applied in Newspaper Coverage: A Case Study 
 
Coding manual for newspaper coverage of the Malayan Emergency conflict study 
 
The following is a 14-item coding manual used in the content analysis of The Times (London) 
and Straits Times (Singapore) newspapers on propaganda messages that appeared during the 
Malayan Emergency. 
 
Coding Date:  ____________________________________ 
Title/Headline of article:  _____________________________________ 
 
 
 
1. ID Number of article    
0001 to 1000 
 
2. Newspaper analysed 
(1) Times (London) 
(2) Straits Times (Singapore) 
 
3. Date of Newspaper: day/month/year  
 
4. Page number 
 
5. Space allocated to Malayan stories (measured in words)       
 
      
Prominent categories/themes covered in the press as per items (6–12) 
(To be coded as Yes/No) 
 
      6.   Riots          1. Yes   2. No        
      7.   Killings by insurgents      1. Yes   2. No 
      8.   Armed robberies                  1. Yes  2. No 
      9.   Abduction of civilians by insurgents     1. Yes  2. No 
    10.  Ambushes by insurgents      1. Yes  2. No 
    11.   Insurgents killing to steal weapons                    1. Yes   2. No 
    12. Links to communist countries/organisations/groups  
    1.  Soviet Russia  
2.  China   
3.    Other e.g. Vietnam, Australian Communist Party-Party Secretary Mr. Sharkey;  
Anti-imperialists-India  
     9. N/A 
 
13. Adjectival descriptors used when reporting on members of the Communist Party 
 
1. Communist-Terrorists 
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2. Terrorists 
3. Bandits 
4. Gangs 
5. Insurgents 
6. Comrade 
7. Reds 
            8.    Other (Guerrillas, Enemy) 
            9.    Not applicable 
 
14.  Racial profiling used on members of the Communist Party 
 
1.   Chinese 
2.   Malay 
3.   Indian 
4.   Other  
9.     Not applicable 
 
 
Note: This is an abridged version of the original coding instrument used. This coding 
document includes only the variables relevant to this paper. 
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